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SILENCE IS ANYTHING BUT GOLDEN: LAWS OF 




On July 8, 2012, Theresa Carsten was employed by the Inter-Tribal 
Council of Nevada (“ITCN”), a non-profit organization made up of twenty-
six federally recognized Nevada tribes, as the director of the Women, 
Infants, and Children Program.
1
 One day later, Carsten was fired for, as she 
alleged in a complaint filed against the ITCN, seeking leave under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to address a “serious medical 
condition” from which she was suffering.
2
 In the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada, Carsten’s suit was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, as the ITCN was covered by tribal sovereign immunity.
3
 While 
addressing the issues raised in Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada at 
the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals raised one significant, 
unaddressed question on which Carsten’s suit turns: Does the FMLA even 
apply to Indian tribes?
4
  
Allowing this question to remain unanswered disadvantages employees 
like Theresa Carsten by depriving them of the FMLA’s benefits. Signed by 
President Clinton in 1993, the FMLA was intended to “support families in 
their efforts to strike a workable balance between the competing demands 
of the workplace and the home.”
5
 The FMLA guarantees, for eligible 
employees in the United States, twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-
month period to care for “newborn or adopted children, relatives with 
serious medical conditions,” or the employee’s health problems.
6
 
Empirically, the FMLA has proven to be a beneficial tool for American 
workers. When an eligible employee takes FMLA leave, employers must 
maintain health insurance benefits for their employee as if no leave had 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, No. 3:12-cv-00493-MMD-WGC, 2013 
WL 4736709, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2013), rev’d, 599 F. App’x 659 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at *1-*2. 
 4. Carsten, 599 F. App’x at 660. 
 5. Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch: The Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 175, 175 (1997) (quoting COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE 
BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES xiii (1996)). 
 6. Id. at 176.  
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While the effects of the FMLA—historically significant because it was 
the first federal law in the United States to require job-protected parental 
leave—have been minimal, they have been positive.
8
 A large majority of 
employers impacted by the FMLA, more than 90%, report that complying 
with the law’s requirements has “either no noticeable effect or a positive 
effect on business operations.”
9
 From the employee prospective, 16% of 
eligible workers utilize the leave available to them, while only 5% report 
being unable to take leave when needed.
10
 Plainly, the FMLA is not a 
windfall for the American worker, but it has benefited a portion of the 
workforce without unduly burdening employers.  
Unfortunately, considering first the contours of tribal sovereignty 
relevant to the applicability of the FMLA to Indian tribes and second 
judicial interpretations of laws of general applicability like the FMLA, it 
remains unclear today whether these benefits extend to Indian tribes. This 
Comment endorses the prevailing judicial interpretation of laws of general 
applicability that would apply the protections of the FMLA to Indian tribes 
as the only interpretation that best navigates all of the interests at play in 
answering this question. True, this interpretation will leave employees 
without the ability to enforce those protections by private lawsuit, but that 
is a problem that only Congress can solve.  
I. Tribal Sovereignty 
Whether the FMLA applies to individuals employed by Indian tribes 
turns on two questions of tribal sovereignty. First, addressed by the parties 
in Carsten, are issues related to tribal sovereign immunity from suit.
11
 
Second, raised upon appellate review in Carsten, is the sovereign right of 
tribes to govern themselves, including exercising authority to regulate “the 
health and safety of workers in tribal enterprises.”
12
 As these principles 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 175. 
 9. News Release, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Family and Medical Leave 
Act Benefits Workers and Their Families, Employers (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.dol.gov/ 
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20130175.htm. 
 10. Jacob Alex Klerman, et al., Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Executive 
Summary, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/ 
FMLA-2012-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
 11. Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, 599 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 12. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).  
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have distinct contours, they must be addressed independently. Indeed, there 
is a distinct difference between the “right to demand [a tribe’s] compliance” 
with a law and the “means available to enforce” that law.
13
 
A. Immunity from Suit 
Tribal sovereign immunity from suit is a controlling principle in 
determining the means available to enforce the FMLA. This immunity has 
developed as a common law doctrine and is derived from the language used 
in the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause, which treats tribes as 
governments.
14
 Over time, the doctrine has become recognized as “a 
necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”
15
 Because 
of its prominence in questions of tribal governance, the Supreme Court has 
often confronted questions regarding the limits of tribal sovereign immunity 
from suit and found that it is a broad concept with few limitations.
16
 
For example, in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the Court 
noted that this immunity continues to be a vital component of tribal 
sovereignty.
17
 Therein, the state of Michigan sued the Bay Mills Indian 
Community over the operation of a Class III gaming facility on land 
purchased through a congressional land trust.
18
 The Court, in defining the 
contours of tribal sovereign immunity from suit, opined that there is no 
exception in this immunity “for suits arising from a tribe’s commercial 
activities, even when they take place off Indian lands.”
19
 In fact, tribal 
immunity extends to any “arms of the tribes.”
20
 Likewise, immunity from 
suit extends to tribal officials and employees when acting within the scope 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).  
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
7.05(1)(a), at 636 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds, 2012 & Supp. 2017) [hereinafter COHEN] 
(citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014)).  
 15. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation v. World Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986)).  
 16. Cohen notes that “[s]even Supreme Court cases since 1977 have delineated the 
contours of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.” COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(a), 
at 636-37.  
 17. 134 S. Ct. at 2030-31.  
 18. Id. at 2028-29.  
 19. Id. at 2031.  
 20. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(a), at 637 (noting that “arms of the tribes” analysis 
“considers tribal involvement in the creation and control of the entity, tribal intent to clothe 
the entity with immunity, and whether the entity serves tribal sovereign interests such as 
economic development”).  
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 The Court, however, has suggested that the holding of 
Ex parte Young, which permits suit against individuals in their official 
capacity for either declaratory or injunctive relief, extends to Indian tribes.
22
 
Nonetheless, this exception is decidedly narrow, permitting only suits 




While the reach of tribal immunity from suit is expansive, it is not an 
absolute shield to all suits. For example, suits filed by the United States are 
never barred by this immunity.
24
 Moreover, Indian tribes are subject to suit 
where “Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its 
immunity.”
25
 As to the latter, there was some historical uncertainty as to 
whether “tribes could waive their own sovereign immunity without 
congressional approval.”
26
 Today, however, tribes may waive their 
immunity either by law or by contract, provided they do so “clearly.”
27
 And 
so, where a tribe voluntarily agrees to a binding arbitration clause and state 
courts have jurisdiction over the resulting arbitration, the tribe has waived 
its immunity.
28
 That decision, however, in C & L Enterprises v. Citizen 
Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe turned on two key facts: the contract in 
question expressly noted that the American Arbitration Association rules 
would govern any arbitration and the contract’s choice of law clause “made 
it clear that the parties had selected Oklahoma law as the applicable law.”
29
  
Clearly, tribal waiver of immunity is a fact-specific question, drawing on 
the actions of the tribe at issue and the nature of the suit brought. Therefore, 
whether tribes have waived immunity from suit under the FMLA is a 
question beyond the scope of this paper. Courts have addressed many novel 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See id. § 7.05(1)(a), at 638 (citing Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 
(10th Cir. 1997); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F2d. 476, 479 (9th Cir. 
1985)).  
 22. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986). Tribes are, 
however, immune from suits against them by states. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 
1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 25. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).  
 26. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(c), at 643 & n.51 (citing Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 
66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895) (“[T]he United States has never given its permission that 
these Indian Nations might be sued generally, even with their consent.”)).  
 27. See id. § 7.05, at 644 & n.52. 
 28. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 
411, 419 (2001). 
 29. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(c), at 644 (citing C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 419). 
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arguments under this principle of sovereignty in relation to the FMLA, 
however. In Muller v. Morongo Casino, Resort, and Spa, a slot attendant at 
the Morongo Casino, Crystal Muller, alleged that the Morongo Indian Tribe 
had waived sovereign immunity from suit under the FMLA by entering into 
a gaming compact with the State of California.
30
 The court found that the 
Tribe had not waived immunity under the FMLA because, although the 
compact did contain waivers for “different categories of claims” unrelated 
to the FMLA, there was no “clear waiver of immunity from suit for 
employment-related claims.”
31
 Even though the Tribe recognized that 
Muller had rights under the FMLA, it had not clearly expressed intent to 




Clarity is also required for the United States to authorize lawsuits against 
tribes. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court was adamant 
that any abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit by Congress 
“‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’”
33
 Historically, 
Congress has been rather stingy with its ability to waive this immunity. For 
example, tribal immunity from suit was only partially waived in the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968,
34
 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
35
 and other 
congressional acts.
36
 The Bankruptcy Code, which waives the sovereign 
immunity defense of “any ‘governmental unit,’”
37
 may even have failed to 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Muller v. Morongo Casino, Resort, & Spa, No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx), 2015 
WL 3824160, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015). 
 31. Id. at *6-7. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 
(2012)), cited in COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 640. 
 35. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2721 (2012)), discussed in COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 641. 
 36. See COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 641 & nn. 35-38 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1)(C) (2012) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 
U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (Resources Conservation and Recovery Act); 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5125 
(2012) (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act)). 
 37. Id. § 705(1)(b), at 642 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012)) (defining governmental 
unit as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a 
District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic 
government.”)). 
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waive tribal sovereign immunity from suit.
38
 At times, Congress has 
considered “broader abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity,” at least in 
the context of regulations pertaining to contracting with tribes, but declined 
to enact any such proposals.
39
 
Simply, the default position regarding tribes is “immunity; and to 
abrogate such immunity, Congress must unequivocally express that 
purpose.”
40
 Therefore, anything short of a clear, unequivocal expression in 
the FMLA that Congress intended to waive tribal immunity from suit for 
violations of this law will be insufficient. Congress did not merely fail to 
make a sufficiently clear expression; rather, it failed to make any expression 
as to tribal sovereign immunity at all.
41
 As several courts have noted, the 
FMLA falls well short of waiving tribal sovereign immunity, rendering 
individuals incapable of suing their tribal employers for failure to afford 
them rights under the law.
42
 Therefore, as it pertains to the FMLA, lawsuits 
by private individuals are not an available means for enforcing the law. 
Enforcing the FMLA is limited to suit by the federal government and there 
has yet to be such a suit. Nonetheless, “whether an Indian tribe is subject to 





                                                                                                                 
 38. See In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Cattle 
Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).  
 39. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(b), at 643. 
 40. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted). 
 41. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).  
 42. See Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nev., 599 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“The district court correctly held that the FMLA does not abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity.”); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The FMLA makes no 
reference to the amenity of Indian tribes to suit.”); Morrison v. Viejas Enters., No. 
11cv97WQH(BGS), 2011 WL 3203107, at *1, *3 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (“The Family 
Medical Leave Act is a law of general application that is silent with respect to Indian 
tribes.”); Pearson v. Chugach Gov. Servs. Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477 (D. Del. 2009) 
(“The only courts to examine whether tribal organizations are subject to the FMLA's 
employer obligations held, based on the doctrine of tribal immunity, th[at] there is not [a] 
private cause of action under the FMLA against tribal organizations.”); Myers v. Seneca 
Niagara Casino, 488 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Thus, Congress has not 
expressly abrogated the sovereignty of Indian Nations in the FMLA, and Congress must 
expressly do so for there to be an effective abrogation.”). 
 43. Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 
1130 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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B. Applicability of the FMLA to Indian Tribes 
Whether the requirements of the FMLA apply to Indian tribes or tribal 
businesses is a separate question, speaking to the right of an individual to 
demand a tribe’s compliance with the law. As noted, regulation like the 
FMLA is indisputably within the purview of each tribe as a sovereign 
entity.
44
 Tribes possess, however, only “a limited sovereignty that is subject 
to complete defeasance,” meaning Congress may abrogate a tribe’s 
sovereign right to regulate on this subject.
45
 Unlike abrogation of tribal 
sovereign immunity from suit, however, it is unclear what is required of 
Congress to abrogate this sovereign right.  
 Undoubtedly, Congress may affect such abrogation with a clear 
expression to do so.
46
 The FMLA, however, has no such expression.
47
 
Indeed, the FMLA makes no reference at all to Indian tribes. The issue 
presented by the FMLA, then, as it pertains to its applicability to Indian 
tribes, is whether “congressional silence” operates as “an expression of 
intent to exclude tribal enterprises from the scope of an act to which they 
would otherwise be subject.”
48
 That question is, as of yet, unanswered by 
the Supreme Court and has been inconsistently answered by the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals. The result is that determining whether the requirements 
of the FMLA extend to Indian tribes and tribal businesses largely depends 
on which appellate jurisdiction hears the dispute.  
The various approaches to the applicability of general statutes to Indians 
can be grouped, however, into two prevailing strands of jurisprudence 
flanked by less popular variations. Most frequently employed by the courts 
is an approach coined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Donovan v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, which presumes the applicability of these 
statutes to Indians subject only to three narrow exceptions.
49
 On the 
contrary, other courts employ a presumption of non-applicability, holding 
that general statutes can reach only as far as the legislature expressly 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (“No 
one doubts that the Tribe has the inherent right to regulate the health and safety of workers 
in tribal enterprises.”). 
 45. Id. at 1115.  
 46. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).  
 47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012). 
 48. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115. 
 49. Id. at 1115-16. 
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 A third, significantly less favored approach, determines 
applicability of a general statute based on the nature of the Indian activity 
that the statute would regulate, applying statutes that would govern 
“commercial enterprises” to Indians but not those that would affect 
traditional “governmental functions.”
51
 As with any decisional law doctrine, 
there are outliers and inconsistencies. For the most part, however, the 
dispute as to how the courts should adjudicate laws of general applicability 
centers on where the court should place the presumption. 
1. Precedent 
a) SCOTUS 
The root of inconsistency at the appellate level is inconsistency at the 
Supreme Court, resulting specifically from the Court’s decision in Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.
52
 Tuscarora presented a 
challenge to the applicability of the Federal Power Act, which authorized 
power companies to condemn lands “necessary to the construction, 
maintenance, or operation” of a project licensed by the Federal Power 
Commission, to reservation lands.
53
 In the end, the Court held that the 
Federal Power Act authorized the condemnation of Indian lands for 
licensed projects, despite the Tuscarora Indian Nation’s objections that the 
taking of Indian lands would require “the express consent of Congress 
referring specifically to those lands.”
54
 Tuscarora’s appellate progeny, at 
least regarding the applicability of “a general statute in terms applying to all 
persons,” dovetails not from the Court’s holding, but from its dictum.
55
 The 
Court opined that while it may once have been that “‘[g]eneral acts of 
congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest 
an intention to include them’ . . . , it is now well settled by many decisions 
of th[e] Court that a general statute . . . includes Indians and their property 
interests.”
56
 While the Tuscarora dictum has been the lodestar for many 
                                                                                                                 
 50. This approach has been used in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra text 
accompanying notes 146-154 & 160-176, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra text 
accompanying notes 155-159. 
 51. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  
 52. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
 53. Id. at 115.  
 54. Id. at 118.  
 55. Id. at 116 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884)). 
 56. Id.; see also Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418 
(1935); Chouteau v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 38 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1930).  
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courts confronting questions of general applicability, other courts have 
noted that this language is inconsistent with other decisions of the Supreme 
Court.  
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
57
 for example, the Supreme Court 
used language inconsistent with Tuscarora that suggested congressional 
silence “cannot signal an undermining of established tribal authority.”
58
 The 
Court granted certiorari in Merrion to determine whether the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe had the authority to impose a severance tax on “any oil and 
natural gas severed, saved, and removed from Tribal lands.”
59
 The Tribe 
had enacted the statute that created this tax pursuant to its constitution, 
which afforded the tribal council the authority to “levy and collect taxes and 
fees on tribal members, and . . . to impose taxes and fees on non-members 
of the tribe doing business on the reservation.”
60
 Though this tax was a 
proper exercise of authority by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court 
acknowledged that the United States federal government had the authority 
to divest the Tribe of this power.
61
 The issue, then, was whether the federal 
government had done so. 
One argument raised by the oil and gas producers challenging the tax 
imposed upon them by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe was that “Congress 
implicitly took away” the Tribe’s power to impose this tax.
62
 The Court 
noted that Congress had enacted several pieces of legislation, relied upon 
by the parties challenging the tax, relating to taxation of this sort.
63
 None of 
that legislation, however, provided a “clear indication[],” as was required 
by the Merrion Court, that Congress intended to deprive the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe of its taxing authority.
64
 Congressional silence, at best, 
instructed the Court that there was an ambiguity as to the Tribe’s authority, 
and any doubt must be resolved in the Tribe’s favor to comport with 
“traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of 
encouraging tribal independence.”
65
 Indeed, the Court provided a helpful 
summation of Merrion on this question: “a proper respect both for tribal 
sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
 58. KAIGHN SMITH, JR., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY 53 (2011). 
 59. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982).  
 60. Id. at 135. 
 61. Id. at 149 (noting “Congress may limit tribal sovereignty”).  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 152.  
 65. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).  
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cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of 
legislative intent.”
66
 Unfortunately, the Court stopped short of indicating 
whether the caution of Merrion abrogated Tuscarora’s broad language. 
The Court had another opportunity to nullify the Tuscarora dictum in 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.
67
 There, the Court addressed 
whether a federal district court could exercise diversity jurisdiction over a 
dispute involving both members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe and events 
that occurred within the Blackfeet Tribal Reservation without first allowing 
the tribal court system to determine its own jurisdiction.
68
 Edward LaPlante 
brought suit in Blackfeet Tribal Court against Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Company alleging the Company acted in bad-faith when it refused to settle 




LaPlante’s suit turned on his employer’s liability, which would be 
imputed to Iowa Mutual, the employer’s insurer.
70
 Iowa Mutual sought to 
have the insurance dispute heard in federal court based, in part, on the 
assertion that the existence of a federal diversity statute displaces, by 




As in Merrion, the LaPlante Court rejected the notion that a statute silent 
as to its implications for Indian tribes could operate as a limit on tribal 
sovereignty.
72
 Though the United States federal government did have the 
authority to limit the jurisdiction of tribal courts, the Court declined to 
“read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction” by federal statute—absent 
either an explicit reference to Indians or evidence in the legislative history 
that Indians were considered in crafting the legislation—as having done 
so.
73
 Admittedly, the historical backdrop of the federal diversity statute 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 149 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).  
 67. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
 68. Id. at 11 (“The question before us is whether a federal court may exercise diversity 
jurisdiction before the tribal court system has an opportunity to determine its own 
jurisdiction.”).  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 17-18 (“Although Congress undoubtedly has the power to limit tribal court 
jurisdiction, we do not read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction to have implemented 
such a significant intrusion on tribal sovereignty . . . .”). 
 72. Id. at 18 (“In the absence of any indication that Congress intended the diversity 
statute to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner’s invitation to hold 
that tribal sovereignty can be impaired in this fashion.”). 
 73. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  
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made Iowa Mutual’s position unlikely to prevail because nearly no tribal 
courts existed when the statute was enacted.
74
 Moreover, the application of 
the federal diversity statute turns on citizenship and for much of American 
history Indians were not considered citizens of either states or sovereign 
tribes, rendering the diversity statute inapplicable.
75
 Nonetheless, the Court 
spoke broadly in LaPlante and declared that “[i]n the absence of any 
indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the 
jurisdiction of tribal courts, . . . tribal sovereignty can[not] be impaired in 
this fashion.”
76
 Unlike in Tuscarora, the LaPlante Court found no 
significance in the combination of a statute’s generality and silence as to its 
applicability to Indians. 
b) Presumption of Applicability
77
 
One of the earliest attempts at sorting out the effect of statutes of general 
applicability to Indian tribes is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, finding that the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act
78
 (“OSHA”) “applie[d] to the commercial activities 
carried on by the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.”
79
 Coeur d’Alene pitted an 
Indian-owned commercial grain farm that sold its product on the open 
market against the United States Department of Labor, which had 
conducted a “consensual inspection of two grain elevators on the Farm.”
80
 
Having been cited for twenty-one violations of OSHA, which were 
accompanied by a proposed $185 fine, the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm 
challenged the applicability of OSHA to Indians.
81
  
Of course, Congress can expressly apply a statute to Indians.
82
 Laws of 
general applicability that are silent as to their application to Indians, 
however, present a problem. The Ninth Circuit was not shy about its 
endorsement of the Supreme Court’s dictum in Tuscarora, that “a general 
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 17-18. 
 75. Id. at 18. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added).  
 77. This term was first used by Alex T. Skibine. See Alex T. Skibine, Practical 
Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123, 130 (2016). 
 78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012).  
 79. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1114-15.  
 82. Id. at 1116.  
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 The court did, however, recognize three exceptions to 
Tuscarora’s general principle, which were borrowed from an earlier Ninth 
Circuit case regarding the applicability of federal criminal laws to activities 
on reservation lands.
84
 And so, within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, 
federal laws of general applicability are valid against Indians unless (1) the 
statute would affect “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters,” (2) the law would “abrogate rights guaranteed by 
Indian treaties,” or (3) there is evidence that Congress “intended [the law] 
not to apply to Indians.”
85




The Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed suit, incorporating the 
Coeur d’Alene framework in a dispute over the applicability of OSHA to an 
Indian-run business, Mashantucket Sand and Gravel.
87
 There the court was 
urged by Mashantucket Sand and Gravel to apply a framework similar to 
what now controls in the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, 




Notably, Mashantucket Sand and Gravel proposed a hybrid test resulting 
from the Supreme Court’s opinions since Tuscarora,
89





 The result of Dion and LaPlante, the Tribe 
argued, is that “[i]f an act would interfere with rights of tribal self-
governance in internal matters then the court must conclude that the act 
does not apply”—a conclusion that “can only be overcome if it is clear . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 1115-16 (quoting Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99, 116 
(1960)) (“In short, we have not adopted the proposition that Indian tribes are subject only to 
those laws of the United States expressly made applicable to them. Nor do we do so here.”). 
 84. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 85. Id. at 1114 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893-94).  
 86. See Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (2009); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm 
Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683 (1991) (“In general, in the absence of an 
expressed exemption for Indians, ‘a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes 
Indians and their property interests.’”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 182 (1991).  
 87. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 88. Id. at 177 (“MSG would have us start with the presumption that federal statutes of 
general applicability touching upon sovereign rights of Indians do not apply to tribes, absent 
a clear indication of Congress’s intent that the statute override tribal sovereignty.”). 
 89. Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
 90. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
 91. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
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that Congress intended that the act apply in spite of this interference.”
92
 In 
the end, the court rejected this proposed standard as too broad, and adopted 
the view that a statute of general applicability is presumed to apply to 
Indians, barring the three Coeur d’Alene exceptions.
93
 The only exception 
at issue was the first, by which a general statute is not applicable to Indians 
if it affects “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters.”
94
 Because Mashantucket Sand and Gravel conducted activities 
that were commercial, employed non-Indians—which the court held should 
“weigh[] heavily against” Mashantucket Sand and Gravel—and was 
involved in the construction of a casino to engage in interstate commerce, 




So, too, did the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Florida Paraplegic 
Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida.
96
 There, the Florida 
Paraplegic Association and the Association for Disabled Americans alleged 
that a restaurant owned by the Miccosukee Tribe of Florida failed to meet 
the standards of accessibility for disabled persons required by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
97
 The Miccosukee Tribe moved 
to dismiss the action under claims of sovereign immunity from suit.
98
 To be 
fair, the Tribe was correct that the ADA had not waived sovereign 
immunity from suit.
99
 However, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Coeur 
d’Alene framework and determined that application of the ADA to the 
Miccosukee Tribe was neither an abrogation of “rights guaranteed under an 
Indian treaty,” contradiction of “Congress’s intent,”
100
 nor interference 
“with purely intramural matters touching exclusive rights of self-
                                                                                                                 
 92. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 178 (citing Appellee’s Brief at 
20, Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel (No. 95-4200)).  
 93. Id. at 182.  
 94. Id. at 176 (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 179-81. 
 96. 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999) (“As the district court recognized, a general 
statute applies to Indian tribes unless its application would (1) abrogate rights guaranteed 
under an Indian treaty, (2) interfere with purely intramural matters touching exclusive rights 
of self-government, or (3) contradict Congress’s intent.”). 
 97. Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1127 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012)(a) (2012)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1135 (“Because we find that Congress did not unequivocally express an intent 
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity from private suit under Title III of the ADA, we hold 
that the Associations may not pursue this action against the Miccosukee Tribe.”).  
 100. Id. at 1129 (“The Associations and the Miccosukee Tribe agree that no treaty 
relevant to this case exists and that Congress has not specifically expressed its intent that the 
ADA not apply to Indian tribes.”).  
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 The court focused on the last of the three exceptions, 
finding that interstate commercial activities conducted by tribes do not 
constitute intramural matters of self-governance.
102
 This rule remains a vital 




The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adoption of the Coeur d’Alene 
approach has been more contentious than its counterparts. In NLRB v. Little 
River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government, a divided panel of the 
Sixth Circuit adopted the Coeur d’Alene presumption of applicability
104
 
over the boisterous dissent of Judge McKeague, which can be distilled into 
a single rhetorical question: “How does one statement of dictum, in a 1960 
Supreme Court opinion, grow into a ‘doctrine,’ contrary to traditional 
principles of Indian law, yet justifying federal intrusion upon tribal 
sovereignty in 2015?”
105
 The dissent is neither alone nor without merit, as 
other courts have adopted the view that resolves the judge’s concerns, infra. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the Sixth Circuit panel found that “the Coeur 
d’Alene framework accommodates principles of federal and tribal 
sovereignty,” “reflects the teachings” of the Supreme Court, and supplies 
“Indian tribes with the opportunity to show that a generally applicable 
federal statute should not apply to them.”
106
 The court held that the National 
Labor Relations Act
107
 (“NLRA”) did “not undermine the Band’s right of 
self-governance in purely intramural matters,” that Congress did not 
“intend[] the NLRA not to apply to a tribal government’s operation of tribal 
gaming,” and that the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians had no treaty at 
issue.
108
 The Little River Band, then, could not “regulate labor-organizing 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 1129-30 (“We hold, therefore, that because the ADA is a generally applicable 
law and because no exception to the presumption that such statutes apply to Indian tribes 
controls this case, Title III of the ADA governs the Miccosukee Tribe in its operation of its 
gaming and restaurant facility.”).  
 102. Id. at 1129 (“[T]ribe-run business enterprises acting in interstate commerce do not 
fall under the ‘self-governance’ exception to the rule that general statutes apply to Indian 
tribes.”). 
 103. See Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2016).  
 104. 788 F.3d 537, 551 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We therefore adopt the Coeur d’Alene 
framework to resolve this case.”). 
 105. Id. at 565 (McKeague, C.J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 551.  
 107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
 108. Little River Band, 788 F.3d at 555. 
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One month later, another Sixth Circuit panel addressed the applicability 
of the NLRA on appeal by the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan.
110
 A casino operated by this Tribe, the Soaring Eagle Casino and 
Resort, had terminated an employee allegedly in violation of provisions of 
the NLRA.
111
 When the employee sought redress through the NLRB, the 
Tribe objected on sovereignty grounds.
112
 While more sympathetic to the 
Tribe’s argument than the last Sixth Circuit panel to address the issue, 
delivering a multi-page criticism of the Coeur d’Alene framework, the court 
was nonetheless bound by the Little River Band precedent and upheld the 
applicability of the NLRA to the Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort.
113
 
A number of courts that have addressed whether a general statute, silent 
as to its relationship with Indians, applies nonetheless to Indians have 
implemented the Tuscarora presumption of applicability subject only to the 
Coeur d’Alene exceptions. The chronology of these cases, moreover, 
reflects Coeur d’Alene’s growing vitality over time. The Seventh Circuit, 
however, has moved away from its endorsement of Coeur d’Alene, at least 
insofar as it has altered the exception to that rule.  
                                                                                                                 
 109. The court described the Tribe’s regulation in the following way: 
In 2005, the Tribal Council enacted the Band's Fair Employment Practices 
Code (FEPC), which it amended most recently on July 28, 2010. In pertinent 
part, . . . [a]s amended, Article XVI, inter alia, grants to the Band the authority 
to determine the terms and conditions under which collective bargaining may 
or may not occur; prohibits strikes, work stoppage, or slowdown by the Band's 
employees and, specifically, by casino employees . . . . Further, Article XVI 
prohibits the requirement of membership in a labor organization as a condition 
of employment. It also prohibits the deduction of union dues, fees, or 
assessments from the wages of employees unless the employee has presented, 
and the Band has received, a signed authorization of such deduction. As 
amended, Article XVII prohibits Band employers, such as the casino, from 
giving testimony or producing documents in response to requests or subpoenas 
issued by non-tribal authorities engaged in investigations or proceedings on 
behalf of current or former employees, when such employees have failed to 
exhaust their remedies under the FEPC.  
Id. at 540-41. 
 110. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016).  
 111. Id. at 653. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 675. 
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears to be marred by 
uncertainty as to what standard governs decisions surrounding inquiries into 
laws of general applicability.
114
 In 1989, only four years after the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued Coeur d’Alene, the Seventh Circuit was 
asked to determine whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”)
115
 applied to the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Tribe such that its provisions governed whether State Farm 
Insurance Company could be made to pay a claim for particular treatments 
that it believed were related to a preexisting condition.
116
 The district court 
determined that the dispute between Alton Smart, whose claim had been 
denied, and State Farm arose under ERISA such that the company’s 




The court employed Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene. As to whether there 
existed any treaty rights that precluded the presumption of applicability, the 
court found that “[s]imply because a treaty exists does not by necessity 
compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability is not 
binding on an Indian Tribe.”
118
 Indeed, under this exception, “[t]he critical 
issue is whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is 
secured by the treaty.”
119
 In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., it did 
not.
120
 Nor was there any evidence of congressional intent that ERISA 
would not apply to Indians.
121
 Finally, and most importantly for 
understanding the Seventh Circuit’s evolution, the court held that an 
argument that application of ERISA would affect tribal “self-governance as 
broadly conceived” was insufficient under the exception that would 
preclude applicability where “the statute threatens the Tribe’s ability to 
govern its intramural affairs.”
122
 Therefore, ERISA applied to the Lac Du 
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe.
123
 
Subsequently, however, when asked whether a federal district court had 
the authority to enforce a subpoena against the Great Lakes Indian Fish and 
                                                                                                                 
 114. SMITH, supra note 58, at 59-61. 
 115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).  
 116. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).  
 117. Id. at 930.  
 118. Id. at 934-35.  
 119. Id. at 935.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 936.  
 122. Id. at 935.  
 123. Id. at 938. 
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Wildlife Commission under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
124
 the 
Seventh Circuit analyzed the question outside of the Coeur d’Alene 
framework and held that it did not.
125
 The Great Lakes Indian Fish and 
Wildlife Commission (“Great Lakes Commission”) is a “consortium” of 
more than a dozen Chippewa Indian tribes from the Great Lakes region.
126
 
Tasked with enforcing the usufructuary rights of these tribes, the Great 
Lakes Commission creates and enforces regulations regarding fishing, 
hunting, and harvesting wild plant life on behalf of the tribes.
127
 During 
hunting and fishing seasons within the Great Lakes Commission’s 
regulatory umbrella, employees work “virtually round the clock,” for a 
number of reasons.
128
 The Department of Labor sought to enforce a 
provision, which may have been no more than a loophole, which would 
require the Great Lakes Commission to pay “time and a half” for any hours 
beyond forty worked in a single week.
129
 Because the Great Lakes 
Commission “admit[ted] that it d[id] not pay time and a half for overtime,” 




The Seventh Circuit’s decision relied heavily on the conclusion that the 
Great Lakes Commission was covered by tribal sovereignty such that 
Congress would have to “give[] a stronger indication than it ha[d in the 
FLSA] that it wants to intrude.”
131
 A motivating factor in the court’s 
classification of the Great Lakes Commission’s work as a sovereign 
function of tribal government was the understanding that Indians are 
allowed to regulate their police, and the employees at the Commission were 
essentially officers policing hunting and fishing.
132
  
                                                                                                                 
 124. 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (2012). 
 125. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 126. Id. at 492. 
 127. Id. at 492-93. 
 128. Id. at 492 (noting long hours result “not only because the hours of daylight are long 
and hunting and fishing take place throughout them, but also because the Indians like to 
spear fish at night, by torchlight”). 
 129. Id. at 492-93 (“Because the Fair Labor Standards Act does not mention Indians, the 
Department of Labor takes the position that the[] exemptions [available to state or local 
governments] are inapplicable to the warden-policemen of the Great Lakes Indian Fish and 
Wildlife Commission.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 495. 
 132. Id. 
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The dissent in Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, 
however, was unpersuaded that the Great Lakes Commission was engaged 
in policing sufficient to constitute a sovereign function of tribal 
government, citing the fact that the employees in question were “not 
employees of a public agency” and “d[id] not have the general arrest 
powers of policemen,” though there had been opportunities for the Great 
Lakes Commission employees to be “bestow[ed] full police powers.”
133
  
In the end, the court differentiated Reich from cases where federal 
statutes of general applicability had been applied to Indian agencies because 
the latter had the effect of imposing regulation merely on “routine activities 
of a commercial or service character.”
134
 This decision has been 
characterized as aligning with the Tenth Circuit’s position that, “absent a 
clear expression of congressional intent, federal courts must presume that 
Congress would not undermine” the exercise of sovereign functions of 
tribal government.
135
 In the Seventh Circuit, then, Reich would suggest that 
congressional intent is the arbiter of disputes regarding the effect of statutes 
of general applicability on the sovereign functions of tribal government.  
In recent years, however, the Seventh Circuit has retreated somewhat 
from the sovereignty-leaning approach it promulgated in Reich. In 
Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, the court had to determine whether 
OSHA applied to the Menominee Indian Tribe’s sawmill in Wisconsin.
136
 
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tuscarora, the court held that 
“statutes of general applicability that do not mention Indians are 
nevertheless usually held to apply to them,” subject to three exceptions that 
differ in part from Coeur d’Alene.
137
 First, as in Coeur d’Alene, a statute of 
general applicability is inapplicable to Indians if there is “persuasive 
evidence that Congress did not intend” it to so apply.
138
 Second, again in 
accord with the Ninth Circuit, a statute of general applicability is 
inapplicable to Indians if its application would “clash with rights granted 
Indians by other statutes or by treaties with Indian tribes.”
139
  
Finally, the court found that general statutes would be inapplicable to 
Indians if their application would “interfere with tribal governance,” 
diverging from the “intramural matters” approach of the other courts that 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. at 504 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 495. 
 135. SMITH, supra note 58, at 60. 
 136. Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. at 670.  
 138. Id. at 671.  
 139. Id. 
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have adopted this framework.
140
 Notably, in Menominee, the court cast 
Reich as an example of this exception: that a statute of general applicability 




However, outside of the dissent, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Reich 
did not even mention Tuscarora, let alone allude to it as a governing 
principle in disputes over statutes of general applicability. Menominee is, 
then, at least a minor retreat from the abrogation of Tuscarora and Coeur 
d’Alene. The retreat may be purely rhetorical in nature, however, because 
other courts have limited this exception to require the statute of general 
applicability to affect “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters.”
142
 The Seventh Circuit’s phrasing, which requires any 
“interfere[nce] with tribal governance,” is more deferential to tribal 
sovereignty, especially as it pertains to the type of “regulatory functions 
exercised by the [Great Lakes] Commission” in Reich.
143
 The Seventh 
Circuit, perhaps, remains dedicated to exercising “forbearance in construing 
legislation as having invaded the central regulatory functions of a sovereign 
entity.”
144
 While the presumption of applicability survives in the Seventh 
Circuit, it does so in a softened form, providing more wiggle room for 
challenges to the applicability of general statutes to Indians.  
c) Presumption of Non-applicability
145
 
While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals crafted a more generous 
modification of Tuscarora than the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals rejected Tuscarora altogether. Donovan v. Navajo Forest 
Products Industries, similar to Coeur d’Alene in the Ninth Circuit, 
addressed the applicability of OSHA to the activities of Navajo Forest 
Products Industries, a company controlled by the tribal government.
146
 An 
Occupational Safety and Health Commission compliance officer cited 
Navajo Forest Products Industries for “one serious and 53 other-than-
serious violations,” proposing a penalty of more than $4,000.
147
 Navajo 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(emphasis added). 
 143. SMITH, supra note 58, at 61 (quoting Solis, 601 F.3d at 671). 
 144. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d at 495. 
 145. Once more, first used by Alex T. Skibine. See Skibine, supra note 77, at 130. 
 146. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982). 
 147. Id. at 710.  
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Forest Products is, essentially, an opinion in two parts.
148
 In the first part, 
the court opined a holding consistent with the second exception recognized 
by the Ninth Circuit—that statutes of general applicability are nonetheless 
not applicable to Indian tribes if the law would “be in derogation of 
Indians’ treaty rights.”
149
 Indeed, the Navajo Tribe of Indians was party to a 
treaty with the United States that limited the right of entry onto Navajo land 
to those individuals entering “in discharge of duties imposed by law.”
150
 
The court found that the history and purpose of this treaty language has 
effectively dictated “that the only federal personnel authorized to enter the 
reservation are those specifically so authorized to deal with Indian 
affairs.”
151
 OSHA included no such specific authorization. Within the Ninth 
Circuit’s Coeur d’Alene framework, this conclusion alone would support 
the determination that OSHA did not apply to the activities of Navajo 
Forest Products Industries. The court, however, went further, holding that 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Merrion “limit[ed] or, by implication, 
overrule[d] Tuscarora [] at least to the extent . . . ‘that a general statute in 
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property 
interests.’”
152
 The court acknowledged that “[t]he United States retains 
legislative plenary power to divest Indian tribes of any attributes of 
sovereignty,” and reasoned that “[a]bsent some expression of such 
legislative intent, however, . . . divestiture of tribal power to manage 
reservation lands” should not be permitted solely on a legal presumption 
that general statutes apply to Indians.
153
  
The presumption of applicability, in the Tenth Circuit, has been turned 
on its head. In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, the court clarified the rule that 
follows from Donovan, 
We believe that unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates 
that in cases where ambiguity exists (such as that posed by the 
ADEA’s silence with respect to Indians), and there is no clear 
indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty 
rights (as manifested, e.g., by the legislative history, or the 
existence of a comprehensive statutory plan), the court is to 
                                                                                                                 
 148. SMITH, supra note 58, at 56-57. 
 149. Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d at 711. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. at 713 (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 
116 (1960)).  
 153. Id. at 714. 
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In tow by the Tenth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that Tuscarora’s language was inapplicable when the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission brought action under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act
155
 against the Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and 
Construction Company, owned by the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Tribe.
156
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is 
assuredly a statute of general applicability and makes no mention of its 
applicability to Indians.
157
 Nonetheless, the court was unpersuaded in 
regards to the applicability of Tuscarora because the case presented an 
issue of the statute’s applicability to “a specific right reserved to the 
Indians,” though not one based in treaty.
158
 The Eighth Circuit requires, 
then, “some affirmative evidence of congressional intent, either in the 
language of its statute or its legislative history,” to apply statutes of this 
type to Indian tribes.
159
  
The Tenth Circuit does have some jurisprudential outliers, however, such 
as Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.
160
 R.H. Nero was one of many 
descendants of slaves owned by the Cherokee Nation who brought suit, 
alleging that they were afforded “the rights and privileges of Cherokee 
citizenship, although they are not of Cherokee blood,” by an 1866 treaty 
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.
161
 The Cherokee 
Nation asserted sovereignty as a defense to the suit, to which the 
descendants responded by noting a number of statutory schemes that they 
believed authorized the action.
162
 The court analyzed the statutes under the 
Coeur d’Alene framework, holding that because “no right is more integral 
to a tribe’s self-governance than its ability to establish its membership,” 
                                                                                                                 
 154. EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).  
 156. EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Const. Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 
1993).  
 157. SMITH, supra note 58, at 58-59. 
 158. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 248 (“Both parties acknowledge that Fond du Lac Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa is a federally recognized Indian tribe. Inherent in the tribe’s quasi-
sovereignty is the tribe’s power to ‘make their own substantive law in internal matters and to 
enforce that law in their own forums.’”). 
 159. Id. at 250. 
 160. 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 161. Id. at 1458. 
 162. Id. at 1458-59.  
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applying the statutes in question to the Cherokee Nation would “affect the 
Tribe’s right to self-governance in a purely internal matter.”
163
 While the 
language used to assess one of the exceptions is different, the fact remains 
that in Nero the court strayed from its assessment of Tuscarora as having 
been abrogated by the Supreme Court.  
The court corrected its course toward, but not directly in accord with, a 
presumption of inapplicability in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan.
164
 Pueblo of 
San Juan was first heard by the Tenth Circuit in 2000 and later heard on 
rehearing en banc in 2002. The dispute asked whether the Pueblo of San 
Juan, an Indian Tribe, “ha[d] the authority to enact and enforce a right-to-
work tribal ordinance prohibiting union security agreements from 
companies engaged in commercial activity on tribal lands,” which the 
NLRB challenged as a violation of the NLRA.
165
 In the first hearing, the 
court dismissed the appellants’ reliance on Tuscarora, noting first that “the 
NLRA by its terms is not a statute of general application [because] it 
excludes states and territories” and second that Donovan acknowledged that 




In many ways, the Tenth Circuit doubled down on this approach in the 
en banc rehearing. In others, however, it retreated, saving the Tuscarora 
approach that prevails in the Ninth and Second Circuits from complete 
extinction. First, the court reinforced its holding in Navajo Forest Products 
Industries, noting that “Congress’ silence as to the tribes can . . . hardly be 
taken as an affirmative divestment of [Indian’s] existing ‘general authority, 
as sovereign[s], to control economic activity’ on territory within their 
jurisdictions.”
167
 Indeed, this is contrary to the dictum in Tuscarora that 
was central in Coeur d’Alene. However, when the Pueblo of San Juan court 
turned to Tuscarora, it fell short of concluding that it had been abrogated, 
relying instead on its inapplicability to the facts at hand.
168
 Although, in 
Navajo Forest Products Industries, the Tenth Circuit decided that 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 1463. 
 164. 280 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 165. Id. at 1279. 
 166. Id. at 1283.  
 167. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)). 
 168. Id. at 1199 (“Thus Tuscarora is not persuasive here. We are convinced it does not 
apply where an Indian tribe has exercised its authority as a sovereign—here, by enacting a 
labor regulation—rather than in a proprietary capacity such as that of employer or 
landowner.”). 
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Tuscarora had been abrogated, twenty years later the court concluded that 
Tuscarora persists, but only in a narrow form.  
The status of the Tenth Circuit’s position on Tuscarora and Coeur 
d’Alene is made less clear by the court’s decision in Shivwits Band of 
Paiute Indians v. Utah.
169
 The Shivwits Band purchased land near a 
highway in Utah and leased it to a developer who was utilizing the space 
for billboard advertising.
170
 The state sought to prevent the advertising on 
the grounds that it violated state and local law.
171
 The state was driven in 
part by financial incentives offered through the Highway Beautification 
Act
172
 (“HBA”) to states that provide “for effective control of the erection 
and maintenance along the Interstate System . . . of outdoor advertising.”
173
 
The dispute regarded, in relevant part, whether the Shivwits Band of Paiute 
Indians were subject to the HBA, which dictates that “outdoor 
advertising . . . in areas adjacent to the Interstate System . . . should be 
controlled . . . to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, 
and to preserve natural beauty.”
174
  
However, as the concurrence noted, the majority disregarded the 
question of whether the HBA applied to Indians, focusing instead on the 
conclusion that if “the HBA does apply to Indian lands, it is subject to 
federal, not state, enforcement.”
175
 The concurring opinion, however, 
engaged in an analysis of the HBA as a general statute and applied the 
Coeur d’Alene framework.
176
 And so, the standing of Tuscarora and Coeur 
d’Alene in the Tenth Circuit is unclear. The totality of the court’s decisions, 
however, is plainly leaning toward presuming inapplicability in dealing 
with general statutes. So, too, is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
d) Applicability as a Sliding Scale 
Confronted by the inconsistencies between its sister courts, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals has coined a novel approach to laws of general 
applicability that draws on the totality of the available jurisprudence.
177
 As 
many of the other cases have, San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB 
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involved the applicability of the NLRA to a casino operated by the San 
Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians on its reservation.
178
 The 
proceeding arose from a competition between the Communication Workers 
of America and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
International (“HERE”) unions, each vying to unionize the employees of 
the casino.
179
 HERE alleged that the Tribe had “interfered with, coerced and 
restrained employees in the exercise of their [collective bargaining] rights” 
by denying HERE access to Casino employees.
180
 Moreover, HERE 
contended that the Tribe had “dominated and discriminatorily supported” 
the competing union by allowing it access to the employees to “distribute 
leaflets,” “communicate with Casino employees on Casino property during 
working hours,” and otherwise attempt to “organiz[e] Casino 
employees.”
181
 As is the usual course of these disputes, the Tribe 




The D.C. Circuit acknowledged, much like the Tenth and Eighth 
Circuits, “conflicting Supreme Court canons of interpretation that are 
articulated at a fairly high level of generality,” before crafting a test that it 
believes accommodates each of those canons.
183
 The court reconciled 
Tuscarora’s presumption of applicability with later decisions of the 
Court—those that other Circuits suggest overrule Tuscarora—by 
“recognizing that, in some cases at least, a statute of general application can 
constrain the actions of a tribal government without at the same time 
impairing tribal sovereignty.”
184
 The rule employed in San Manuel, then, is 
that if “constraint [of the tribe with respect to its governmental functions] 
will occur, then tribal sovereignty is at risk and a clear expression of 
Congressional intent is necessary.”
185
 However, “if the general law relates 
only to the extra-governmental activities of the tribe, and in particular 
activities involving non-Indians, . . . then application of the law might not 
impinge on tribal sovereignty” and, presumably, it may be applied without 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at 1308-09. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1309.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1310.  
 184. Id. at 1312. 
 185. Id. at 1313. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/5
No. 1] COMMENTS 231 
 
 
a clear expression of congressional intent.
186
 In the end, the court held that 
the NLRA presented a “negligible” impact on tribal sovereignty, such that 
there was no “demand [for] a restrictive construction” of the law.
187
 And so, 
the D.C. Circuit provides the final approach to interpreting laws of general 
applicability and their relationship with Indians: the sliding scale approach.  
2. Application to the FMLA 
a) FMLA as a Law of General Applicability 
Before applying any of the existing tests to the FMLA, it must, as a 
threshold matter, be shown that the law is one of general applicability that 
is silent as to its application to Indians. That the FMLA is silent regarding 
Indians has already been noted.
188
 More difficult is the question of whether 
the statute is sufficiently general as to qualify as a law of general 
applicability. While, in many instances, courts treat this as an assumed 
characteristic of the statutes they are interpreting, some courts have 
provided a general rubric. For example, in Reich, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered whether courts have construed the law “liberally, to 
apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction, 
recognizing that broad coverage is essential to accomplish its goals.”
189
 
Similarly, in Florida Paraplegic, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
characterized this inquiry as turning on whether the statute is one that 
“Congress intended to have broad applicability,” as evidenced by the 
language of the law and the definitions it employs.
190
 
By these standards, which are representative of the analysis employed by 
other courts, the FMLA is most assuredly a law of general applicability. 
The stated purpose of the FMLA was one without limits, noting that 
Congress intended “to promote the stability and economic security of 
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity.”
191
 
Moreover, Congress considered the “legitimate interests of employers,” 
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attempted to “minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on 
the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available . . . on a gender 
neutral basis,” and “promote[d] the goal of equal employment opportunity 
for women and men.”
192
 While the FMLA is limited in its reach by 
restricting which businesses would be required to abide its demands, this 
type of limit has never been sufficient, on its own, to thwart a law’s status 
as generally applicable. For example, the FLSA applies only to certain 
enterprises, as defined by the statute.
193
 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit 
found it to be a law of general applicability. Indeed, this determination 
generally turns on congressional intent, not on the number of exceptions 
found within a law, with one notable exception—the NLRA as interpreted 
in Pueblo of San Juan because the law exempts states and territories.
194
 The 
FMLA, however, unlike the NLRA, does not include any broad exceptions 
in the coverage for government entities.
195
 Therefore, the FMLA is most 
likely a law of general applicability in any appellate jurisdiction. 
b) Silence as a Presumption of Non-Applicability 
In those jurisdictions interpreting laws of general applicability that are 
silent in their application to Indians as presumptively inapplicable thereto, 
the fate of the FMLA is evident. At their most strict, these jurisdictions 
refuse to view congressional silence as a “divestment” of a tribe’s sovereign 
right to “control economic activity on territory within their jurisdictions.”
196
 
The FMLA, at least in its relationship with Indians, has been nothing more 
than silent.
197
 In the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the language 
has been somewhat less direct, there must only be “some affirmative 
evidence of congressional intent, either in the language of the statute or its 
legislative history,” for a law to apply to Indians.
198
 Even under this lax 
standard, however, the FMLA would not apply to Indians because there is 
no evidence in its legislative history that Indians were even considered by 
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c) FMLA on the Sliding Scale 
Unlike in the jurisdictions in which laws of general applicability are 
presumed not to reach Indians, the plight of the FMLA under the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals sliding scale approach is difficult to predict. In the 
one instance in which this approach has been employed, the decision turned 
on the degree to which applying the statute would constrain governmental 
functions.
200
 In that case, which involved the application of the NLRA to 
casino workers, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the law would only be 
impacting “extra-governmental activities” and, specifically, “activities 
involving non-Indians.” And so, the outcome of a challenge to the 
applicability of the FMLA within this approach to the law would turn on 
what employer/employee relationship precipitated the suit. Were the 
employee one directly involved in implementing governmental programs—
Theresa Carsten, the non-profit employee and director of the Women, 
Infants, and Children Program for the ITCN, for example—then the 
conclusion would likely be that the FMLA constrains tribal government.
201
 
An employee of a casino or other commercial arm of an Indian tribe, 
however, may be capable of receiving the benefits of the FMLA without 
similarly constraining governmental functions.
202
 Indeed, the outcome 
could vary even by employee of the same tribe, depending on their 
employer or role in an organization. Notably the employer distinction is 
fluid, with no bright-line rules having been promulgated by the court.  
d) Silence as a Presumption of Applicability 
The most often employed approach to laws of general applicability may 
be the most difficult to predict, as the Coeur d’Alene presumption of 
applicability accounts for several variables. From the outset, however, a 
challenge to the FMLA in a jurisdiction following this approach would be 
uniquely situated because the law would presumptively cover employees of 
Indian tribes. Moreover, one of the three exceptions to that presumption—
triggered by evidence that Congress intended a law to not apply to 
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Indians—would be irrelevant for any review of the FMLA, as both the law 
itself and the statutory history are without reference to Indians.
203
 Evidence 
of this silence would evoke a presumption of applicability within this 
approach, not an exception to that presumption. 
Whether the FMLA would affect any exclusive rights of self-governance 
in purely intramural matters is a more difficult question to answer. It seems 
evident, however, that commercial activities are unlikely to affect 
intramural self-governance. For example, the court in Reich v. 
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel found that a commercial activity could be 
regulated under OSHA based on the activity’s status as commercial, the fact 
that the activity intended to create interstate commerce, and that the tribe 
employed non-Indians in the undertaking of that activity.
204
 It is likely that 
few for-profit enterprises will fail to fulfill these requirements. To be sure, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the scope even 
further, concluding that commercial activities—independent of any other 
variable—are not intramural matters of self-governance.
205
  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided a substantive example of 
an activity that does constitute intramural governance—policing.
206
 In 
Reich, the Seventh Circuit was clear that the right to manage policing is a 
tribal right that is beyond the reach of a silent statute of general 
applicability.
207
 That there was disagreement, moreover, as to whether 
Reich actually presented a case of such policing makes a meaningful 
substantive point—while government based policing is assuredly 
intramural, non-profit or agency based policing (as was the Great Lakes 
Commission) occupies a grey area.
208
 The contours of this exception 
become more clear, then: (1) purely for-profit commercial activities are 
non-intramural, (2) government activities are likely intramural, and (3) non-
profit and government-delegated activities may be intramural. Of course, in 
the Seventh Circuit, as Reich demonstrates, the outcome is slightly different 
because any impact on even non-intramural governmental activities will 
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fulfill this exception; hence the conclusion that the Great Lakes 
Commission was exempt from the FLSA.
209
 
The final exception—whether any treaty rights would be abrogated by 
applying the statute of general applicability to Indians—is the least 
predictable, as it is concerned not with broad concepts, but with specific 
treaty language. However, “[s]imply because a treaty exists does not by 
necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability 
is not binding on an Indian Tribe.”
210
 The issue of treaty rights is often 
disposed of through an agreement between the parties.
211
 When treaty rights 
are at issue in a suit, they tend to be on very specific topics.
212
 The result, 
then, is that this exception is rarely the death knell for the application of a 
general statute to Indians. The nature of the FMLA and the circumstances 
in which it would arise make it likely to be deemed applicable if challenged 
in a jurisdiction that follows a version of the Coeur d’Alene presumption of 
applicability.  
II. Conclusion 
While the relationship between Indians and laws of general applicability 
remains unclear—and will remain unclear so long as the Supreme Court 
continues to deny certiorari on cases that raise the question
213
—there is a 
trend among the lower courts toward the Coeur d’Alene presumption of 
applicability approach, with the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals adhering to some version of it. While 
this approach offers a fair likelihood that the FMLA will be found to apply 
to Indians, that finding is likely to be without benefit to employees like 
Theresa Carsten. Once more, whether an individual has the right to demand 
a tribe’s compliance with a federal statute and the means by which they can 
enforce that statute are separate issues. Therefore, a finding that employees 
have a right to demand compliance with the FMLA will not circumvent the 
reality that those same employees would have no meaningful path to 
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enforcement because the FMLA definitively does not waive tribal 
sovereign immunity from suit. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between Indians and laws of general 
applicability needs to be addressed, and the Coeur d’Alene presumption of 
applicability is the best solution currently available. First, presuming 
applicability provides due deference to congressional acts that are intended 
to be of broad applicability. Second, the treaty rights exception enables a 
court to determine whether any particular tribe has a right to decline 
compliance with a law of general applicability based on agreement with the 
United States. Third, the intramural self-governance exception ensures that 
Congress cannot incidentally impinge on tribal sovereignty. Finally, the 
intent exception ensures that tribes will not be accidentally subjected to 
federal regulation against the wishes of Congress. The flexibility of this 
approach and the manner in which it balances the interests of those 
individuals who would benefit from federal regulation against the interests 
of those tribes whose activities would be regulated makes it an ideal 
solution for all parties. 
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